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factor intensities, and thus unit factor input requirements 
can vary across economies. Using data on net exports of 
a single industry, computers, intellectual property rights 
and factor endowments for 73 countries during 1980–
2000, the paper shows that once technological choices are 
considered, countries with different factor endowments 
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Theories of international trade, such as the factor proportions model, often
assume that countries use similar technologies in production or that techno-
logical dierences are Hicks neutral.1 In contrast, models of biased technical
change assert that innovation and technology adoption are determined by lo-
cal factor endowments. This paper marries these two literatures. It proposes
a matching mechanism between factor endowments and technologies in open
economies, and it studies how the cross-country pattern of trade changes
once technology choices are considered.
The theory concerns economies that are open and dier in their factor
endowments. Economies are composed of multiple goods, which can be pro-
duced with a range of factor-complementary machines. These machines are
traded in a global market, which is characterized by a monopolistic com-
petitive structure. The model is tractable even though it predicts that unit
factor input requirements within industries can vary across countries.
The econometric analyses utilize data on factor endowments, intellec-
tual property rights (IPRs), and net exports of computers and components,
an industry that has received much attention in the technology adoption
and growth literature. The data set covers 73 countries during 1980-2000.
The empirical models test for the existence of multiple technological country
groups in the data, and estimate the factor proportions model in a two-stage
estimation procedure. The technology selection function is modeled as an
Ordered Probit, where endowments and IPRs determine technology choices.
The trade specialization equation follows closely the standard specication
of Rybczynski functions found in the trade literature.
The econometric results from our preferred estimator suggest the exis-
tence of up to four distinct technological groups that dier in terms of their
unit factor input requirements in the production of computers. The evi-
1The term factor-proportions refers both to relative abundance of factors of production
and relative intensity with which dierent factors of production are used in the production
of dierent goods. As Krugman and Obstfeld[23] explain "... because the Heckscher-
Ohlin theory emphasizes the interplay between the proportions in which dierent factors
of production are available in dierent countries and the proportions in which they are
used in producing dierent goods, it is also referred to as the factor-proportions theory."
1dence rejects the hypothesis that the set of estimated Rybczynski coe-
cients are statistically equivalent across technological country groups. Fur-
thermore, these international dierences are at least partly due to dierences
in IPRs, after controlling for factor endowments, relative factor prices and
Hicks-neutral productivity dierences across countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
related literatures. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 solves the equi-
librium of the theoretical model. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy.
Section 6 discusses the empirical results, including alternative explanations
of heterogeneous Rybczynski coecients. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
At least two distinct literatures are related to our model and empirical appli-
cation. The rst one is the trade literature on factor proportions and trade
patterns. The second one concerns biased technical change.
2.1 Trade and factor proportions
This literature can be divided into two strands of research. One explores the
implications of the factor proportions theory under the assumption that all
countries have access to the same technologies. A second assumes that there
are Hicks-neutral technology dierences across countries.
In the rst strand, Harrigan[16] examines the production side of the factor
proportions model. The author employs manufacturing outputs and factor
endowments data for up to 20 OECD countries during 1970-1985. The most
robust evidence suggests that capital abundance is a source of comparative
advantage in most of the sectors, but the eects of skilled- and unskilled-
labor are not clear. The signs of the Rybczynski coecients, however, change
across econometric specications.
In the same vein, but motivated by a slightly dierent question, Schott[33]
investigates whether developed and developing countries specialize in dier-
ent subsets of products as a result of their dierences in factor endowments.
He proposes a methodology that distinguishes single- from multiple-cone
2equilibria and allows for the eect of factor accumulation on a given sector's
output to vary with a country's endowments. Schott[33] uses value-added,
capital stock, and employment data from UNIDO for up to 45 developed and
developing countries across 28 manufacturing industries in 1990. The nd-
ings reject the single-cone framework in favor of a two-cone model with labor-
abundant countries producing relatively little of the most capital-intensive
goods.
Romalis[31] examines how factor proportions determine the structure of
commodity trade by integrating a multicountry version of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model with a continuum of goods with Krugman[22]'s model of mo-
nopolistic competition and transport costs. His model assumes that there
are no factor intensity reversals and that factor shares are xed within in-
dustries and across countries. Two predictions emerge from this framework.
First, countries capture larger shares of world production and trade of com-
modities that more intensively use their abundant factors. Second, countries
that rapidly accumulate a factor see their production and export structures
systematically shift towards industries that intensively use that factor.
In the second strand of the trade literature, Harrigan[17] provides the rst
empirical test of the factor proportions theory in a framework that accounts
for international technology dierences. The author uses manufacturing out-
put shares and factor endowments data for up to 10 developed countries
across 7 industries with data from 1970-1988. The most reliable inferences
across sectors that can be obtained from this study are roughly consistent
with Leamer[24] and Harrigan[16]. Capital and medium-educated workers
are associated with larger GDP output shares in most of the seven indus-
tries (Food, Apparel, Paper, Chemicals, Glass, Metals and Machinery); while
non-residential construction and high-educated workers are related to lower
output shares.
Harrigan[17] improves substantially upon previous empirical frameworks,
but his OECD data have little cross-country variation as high-income coun-
tries have similar factor endowments and sectoral output shares. To overcome
this drawback, Harrigan and Zakrajsek[18] work with a larger sample, which
includes data for up to 28 OECD and non-OECD countries and 12 industries
from 1970-1992. Their evidence arguably supports the neoclassical theory.
3In a related article, Fitzgerald and Hallak[13] estimate the eect of factor
endowments on the pattern of manufacturing specialization in a cross-section
of OECD countries, taking into account that factor accumulation responds
to productivity. The authors show that the failure to control for productivity
dierences across countries produces biased estimates of the Rybczynski co-
ecients. Their model explains 2=3 of the observed dierences in the pattern
of specialization between the poorest and richest OECD countries.
Hakura[15] explores the role of dierences in production techniques to
explain the empirical failure of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vaneck (H-O-V) model.
The paper develops a 2x2 modied H-O-V model that relaxes the assumption
of identical production techniques across countries. Using input-output data
for six member countries of the European Community for the years 1970 and
1980, the paper shows that allowing for international technique dierences
signicantly improves the predictive power of the H-O-V model.
In Redding[29], a country's pattern of specialization at any point in time
is characterized by the distribution of shares of GDP across industries. Its
dynamics are represented by the evolution of the entire cross-sectional distri-
bution of output shares over time. Redding[29] utilizes data on 20 industries
in 7 OECD countries from 1970-1990. A comparison of GDP shares between
1970 and 1990 reveals substantial variation across sectors and countries.
Perhaps more importantly, Redding[29] concludes that in the short run,
common cross-country eects such as technological progress are more impor-
tant in explaining observed changes in specialization than factor endowments
for the majority of the countries. Over longer periods, factor endowments
become relatively more important, and in the innite horizon, factor en-
dowments account for most of the observed variation in specialization. This
evidence is consistent with the idea that changes in relative factor abundance
occur gradually and take time to aect the structure of production.
Overall, the factor proportions model provides a story about static and
dynamic specialization around the world. Some evidence shows that tech-
nological dierences across countries can produce similar patterns of special-
ization in spite of large dierences in factor endowments (Schott[33]). Our
model extends the standard factor-proportions theory to allow for technol-
ogy dierences across countries, thus introducing elements of the literature
4on biased technical change into the factor-proportions literature.
2.2 Biased technical change
This literature can also be divided into two dierent approaches. The rst
one assesses whether factor shares vary systematically with the level of de-
velopment (e.g. Young[34], Gollin[14], Bernanke and Gurkaynak[3], and Or-
tega and Rodriguez[27]). The second investigates whether complementari-
ties between inputs and technology bias technical change (e.g. Acemoglu[1],
Caselli[6]).
The rst literature initially found that labor shares in national income
vary widely, ranging from 0.05 to 0.80 in international cross-sectional data
(e.g. Elias[11] and Young[34]). Gollin[14] questioned these estimations by
arguing that the widely used approach, which is based on Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions, tends to underestimate the labor income of self-employed
workers, and the corrected labor shares fall in the range of 0.65 to 0.80.
This evidence was later rearmed by Bernanke and Gurkaynak[3], but re-
jected by Ortega and Rodriguez[27]. The latter uses industrial survey data
to explore the same question, and controlling for the measurement problem
of self-employed workers it found a signicant negative cross-sectional rela-
tionship between capital share and per capita income within industries. In
a related paper, Dobbelaere and Mairesse[9], nd that imperfections in the
product and labor markets generate a wedge between factor elasticities in
the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue, at rm
and industry levels.
The second approach builds on the works by Kennedy[20], Samuelson[32],
and Drandakis and Phelps[10], who proposed an induced innovation the-
ory that highlights the relation between factor prices and technical change.
The modern formulation of this theory has been presented by Acemoglu[1],
who study how cross-country dierences in factor endowments bias technical
change. In his framework, the price and market-size eects determine the
direction of technological change. The price eect re
ects the incentives to
generate technologies that create more expensive goods. The second eect
captures the incentives to produce technologies for which there is a big mar-
5ket. While the former encourages innovations to complement scarce factors,
the latter leads to technical change favoring abundant factors. The elasticity
of substitution between dierent factors determines the relative magnitudes
of these eects. In the long run, technical change favors the abundant factor
if the elasticity of substitution is suciently large.
Evidence of complementarities between factors of production and technol-
ogy has been provided by Caselli[6], who explored the relationship between
factor endowments and the composition of capital imports. The author nds
that human-capital abundant countries devote a larger share of their in-
vestment to acquire complex technologies, which can only be employed by
skilled-workers.
We depart from the neo-classical trade literature by relaxing the assump-
tion of Hicks neutral technological dierences across countries, by allowing
countries to make their own technology choices. Thus, the model presented
in the following section complements the biased-technical change literature
by analyzing how countries' technology choices alter the impact of factor
endowments on trade patterns.
3 Model
Let c=1,...,C index countries, let f =1,...,F index factors, and let j=1,...,J
index industries. Countries are open to trade in goods and technology. They
dier in factor endowments and the degree of intellectual property rights
protection, m, with m=1,...,M. Each economy has two sectors, a nal good
and a R&D sector.
3.1 Final good sector
Output of industry j in country c, Y c
j , can be written as a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) production function of factor inputs f, V c
jf, and a set




















jf 2 (0;1) is a distribution parameter that captures how important factor f
is in the production of output j. We assume
PF
f=1 
jf = 1. Parameter j is
the elasticity of substitution between two factors. The set of complementary
machines, ~ Ac














f is the number of varieties of factor-f -complementary machines
available to country c, and Ac
jf(i) is the number of type-i machines that
country c acquires. Parameter  determines the elasticity of substitution
between two varieties of the same type of equipment. Final goods producers
face a two-stage decision process. First, they decide how many units of each
factor of production to hire. Second, they choose how many machines to buy
to complement each factor.
3.2 R&D sector
Firms in this sector produce machines that belong to the category of general
purpose technologies and thereby they can be employed in dierent sectors.
The world's technological market has a monopolistic competitive structure.
R&D rms face a two-step decision process. First, they decide to which
country to export. Second, they choose the price per unit of machine.
Each monopolist from country o that produces machines to complement
factor f in country d faces a marginal cost of production, o
f, and a xed cost,
 (ddo;d), of protecting his patent, with  0 > 0 and  (0) = 0. Parameter
do;d stands for the distance between countries. Entry in the research activity
involves a xed cost, o
f.
4 Equilibrium
To nd the equilibrium of the model we proceed in the following manner.
First, we solve backwardly the equilibrium for a representative rm in a
representative sector. Second, we characterize the equilibrium for the whole
economy. To solve the equilibrium for a sector we need to nd the solutions
7to the nal-goods producers' problem and the technology suppliers' problem.
This is presented in the following sections.
4.1 Final good producers
Firms in this sector choose how many machines to buy in order to complement
each factor of production. The problem for a representative rm in sector j


































jf(i) = Y c
j ac
jf(i) and ac
jf(i) is the demand of machine i per unit of

















jf represents the expenditure that country c devotes to complement






f (i)di, and "  1
1  is the
elasticity of substitution between two varieties of machines f. Equation (4)
shows that the demand of machine i is an increasing function of the real




jf, and a negative function of
the price of the machine, pf(i). Given this demand, rms minimize unit cost
functions to determine the optimal unit factor input requirements. They
solve the following problem:















































f represents the cost per unit of factor f in country c. In the opti-
mum, each factor's marginal product equals its marginal cost. The optimal
requirement of factor f per unit of output j in country c, Qc
jf, is as follows:
Q
c








































Equation (6) shows that dierences in technology choices and relative fac-
tor prices lead to endogenous dierences in unit factor input requirements.
Specically, technology choices aect unit requirements through two dierent
channels: a factor saving eect and a relative eciency eect. According to
the rst eect, larger values of ~ ac
jf increase the productivity of the factor and
reduce its requirements. Due to the second eect, factor f becomes relatively
more productive than other factors, which increases rms' incentives to hire
more units. Lower values of ~ wc
f (
jz), and increasingly negative (positive)
dierences between ~ wc
f (
jf) and ~ wc
z (
jz), for z 6= f and z = 1;:::F, make
the second eect more prominent.
4.2 Technology suppliers
A monopolist from country o that sells machines to country d in order to




















9The solution to this problem delivers the following expression for the optimal









This price is a constant markup, ( "
" 1), over the marginal cost of producing
the machine, o
f. Given the price, the monopolist decides whether to export
technology to country d. In doing so, he compares the benets of selling the
machines with the xed cost he has to pay to receive such benets. Thus,
















jf  Y d
j ed
jf. Assuming that   is a linear function of ddo;d, country





is lower than 1.
To continue with the characterization of the equilibrium, we substitute















where D is the set of countries that provide technology to country d, and No
f
is the number of varieties that country o oers to complement factor f. This
number is determined by the free entry condition in the research activity of

















< 1] = 
o
f: (12)
10I is an indicator function that takes value 1 if the condition in brackets is




f , and N
 o
f is the set of varieties
provided to country d by countries other than o.




jf is a function of country d's factor
endowments. Furthermore, because  (0) = 0, each country sells machines
to domestic technology demanders, and the number of varieties produced in
equilibrium is a function of the factor endowments of the country, among
other determinants. This result is thus similar to Schott's multiple-cone
version of the neo-classical model. Both results imply that Nd
f is a function
of the factor endowments of the countries that provide technology to country
d. Thereby, we can rewrite ad














where V o is a vector of the factor endowments of the countries that belong to
set D. By inserting equation (13) into equation (6) we can write unit factor
input requirements as follows:
Q
d



































with z = 1;:::;F and z 6= f. Equation (14) shows that unit factor input
requirements are a function of :
1. IPRs of the destination country, d,











4. factor endowments of technology suppliers, V o, and
3Qd










115. distance to technology suppliers, d
o;d
o2D.
Finally, note that if pairs of technology-trading countries emerge depend-
ing on bilateral distances, and if there is a nite number of groups, then we
can cluster countries across a nite number of technological regimes. Two
countries belong to the same regime if they adopt the same technologies.
This implication emerges in our model because the number of countries, fac-
tors, sectors, and institutional frameworks is nite, and because there is a
xed cost of exporting technology.4
4.3 The economy
To analyze how technology choices aect the impact of factor endowments on
trade, we solve the equilibrium for the aggregate economy. Employing matrix
notation, we dene Q
c as the matrix of unit factor input requirements for






c is the vector of sectoral outputs and V
c is the vector of factor
endowments. Assuming that the number of goods is equal to the number
of products, and denoting by R
c the inverse of matrix Q
c, it is possible






From the previous section, we know that in equilibrium there will be a nite
number of technological groups. We let the data inform us about the par-
ticular number. However, in order to study the implications of technology
4Another mechanism that would group countries into dierent technological regimes,
which could equal the number of countries, is the existence of transport costs for ma-
chines, which would yield machine-price dierences across economies, thus aecting their
technology adoption decisions.
12choices on the pattern of specialization, we assume that countries are clus-
tered in K groups. Output of country c, which belongs to group k, Y
c;k, with
k = 1;:::;K, and worldwide output, Y














w;k is the vector of factor endowments of group k. Denoting
by TBc the trade balance of country c and by sc country c's share of world













The previous system provides the following estimating equation for the net-




























Equation (20) relates net-exports of product j in country c, which belong to
technology group k, with measures of relative abundance of factors f -with
f = 1;:::;F-in country c and a pure consumption eect, which captures the
impact of importing product j from countries that belong to other technolog-
ical groups. The rk
fjs are the analogue to the Rybczynski coecients in the
standard theory. However, in our model, the concept of relative abundance
of a factor in a country is redened, so that a country's endowments are
compared to the endowments of the technological group to which it belongs
instead of being compared to the world's endowments, as in the standard






f ) to equation (20),
we can re-write NX
c;k































f stands for the world's endowment of factor f. Consistent with re-
cent literature on comparative and absolute advantage, equation (21) implies
that the pattern of trade is determined by both relative endowments as well
as relative factor productivity.
5 Empirical Strategy
This section presents the empirics. The analyses focus on the computer
industry, which has received a lot of attention in the technology adoption
and growth literature. The empirical approach begins with the estimation
of the neo-classical Rybczynski equation with a single technological regime.
In turn, we discuss results of ad-hoc two-regime models, where the data are
divided into two groups depending on rankings based on technology selection
variables, namely factor endowments, IPRs, TFP, and relative factor costs.
The rest of this section describes our preferred two-step estimator, which
includes a multivariate technology selection equation.
5.1 The two-step approach
The theoretical framework motivates an empirical model which consists of
two equations as net exports are governed by dierent sets of parameters,
and the set of parameters which determine a particular country's net exports
depend on the technological group to which the country belongs.
The most ecient method to estimate this model is the Full-Information
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimator (see Chiburis and Lokshin[7]). How-
ever, we employ the least ecient method, the Two-Step approach, as it
performs better than the FIML with small samples. A relevant implication
of relying on the Two-Step approach to test our model is that the procedure
increases the chance of rejecting the theory, as it delivers wider condence in-
tervals for the estimated parameters. This implies that if we nd evidence in
14line with our predictions, then our theory is very robust. However, evidence
against the theoretical results may not be enough to reject the theory.
In the rst step we estimate an Ordered-Probit equation and we cluster
countries across technological groups as motivated by the theoretical model.
To do so, we construct an index of technology choices based on the theory,
and we estimate the locations of the cuto points at which the sample splits
across technological regimes.
To estimate the cuto points, we rst assume that the sample splits in a
particular number of groups e.g., 2, 3, or 4, and we estimate the model with
the assumed number of regimes. To determine the optimal cuto points, we
follow Hotchkiss[19] and estimate each model for every reasonable cuto.5
Given such values, in the second step, we estimate the Rybczynski coecients
for each technological group. For such purpose, we employ the OLS approach
but we control for selection.6 Finally, we apply the goodness of t criterium
to identify the set of estimated parameters that best ts the data.
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0 if   1 < Rc
t  R1t





K   1 if RK 1t < Rc
t  1;
5We start by dividing the sample in a way that delivers the maximum number of groups
with no more than 25% of the observations per group. This provides the highest degree of
freedom to move the cut-o points along the range of possible values. The cuto points are
moved iteratively in steps of 1 percentile of the continuous variable we employ to cluster
countries across technological regimes.





( ^ Rjk+1 Rc) ( ^ Rk Rc) as an explanatory
variable of the Rybczynski equation corresponding to regime i.
15where Rc
t is the continuous variable that clusters countries in technological
regimes.7  is a vector of parameters and Zc
t is the vector of the variables
used to estimate the composite index Rc
t.8 c
t is a standard normal shock,
and R1t, R2t, ..., RK 1t are the unknown cuto points, which satisfy the
following condition: R1t< R2t<, ...,< RK 1t. We also dene R0t   1 and
RKt  1 to avoid having to handle the boundary cases separately.
The resulting second-stage Rybczynski equations are:
NX
c;k
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NX
c;k0











t if ~ Rc
t = K   1;
where NX
c;k
t are net exports of computers for country c, which belongs to
group k, in period t. Parameter rk
f is the Rybczynski coecient correspond-
ing to factor f in technology group k. We include four factors of production:
stock of capital, skilled labor, unskilled labor, and arable land. Following
Fitzgeral and Hallak[13], Harrigan[16], and Reeding[29] we interpret he con-
stant term, r0, as the mean eect of omitted factors. Finally, our model relies
on the following assumptions: A1. 
c;k
t  N(0;2
;k), for k = 1;:::;K; A2.
c
t  N(0;1); A3. 2
;kz = 0, for k 6= z and k;z = 1;:::;K; A4. 2
; 6= 0.
7Section 5.2 explains the methodology, the variables, and the economics of the index
variable.
8Our baseline model includes variables that are strictly related to technology adoption






, and weighted averages of the same variables for technology trading partners.
165.2 Indicators and proxies
This section describes the empirical proxies we employ to estimate equations
(22) and (23). It also documents the sources of data.
5.2.1 The technology selection variable
As mentioned, our model suggests that countries face discretely dierent
technological choice sets. Therefore, to construct variable Rc
t we rely on the
theory, according to which the key determinants of the technological group
to which a country belongs are IPRs of the destination country, d, relative













Our baseline model for the selection equation considers variables strictly
related to technology adoption such as IPRs of the destination country, rel-






the same variables for technology trading partners. The latter variables are
weighted by the inverse of the distance between trading countries. To test the
robustness of our specication, we add factor price ratio, namely the ratio of
the manufacturing wages over bank lending interest rates, and national TFP
levels to control for Hicks-neutral technological dierences. Our proxy for Rc
t
is the rst component in the principal component analysis of the variables




Data on capital stocks come from Serven and Calder on[33], who extend the
series provided by the Penn World Tables. The labor force is from the In-
ternational Labor Organization (ILO), and it refers to economically active
population dened as the 25-64 age group. To calculate endowments of high-
and low-skilled labor, we use data on educational attainment from Barro
and Lee[2]. Skilled workers are dened as the population economically active
with at least one year of secondary school. The rest are considered unskilled
17labor. The endowment of arable land comes from the World Bank's World
Tables and it is dened as hectares of arable land.
IPRs
Data on intellectual property rights protection come from Ginarte and Park
[28]. The measure is an index of patent rights at the country level, which
is based on the following categories: extent of patent coverage, membership
in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, enforce-
ment mechanisms, and duration of protection. Each of these categories is
scored from 0 to 1. The un-weighted sum of these ve values constitutes the
overall value of the IPRs index.
Net exports of computers
Bilateral data on imports and exports of computers come from Feenstra et
al.[12]. The data are available at the 4-digit level of the Standard Interna-
tional Trade Classication, Revision 2. To measure net exports of computers
for the global industry, we consider the following categories, 7521, 7522, 7523,
and 7528, which are the same as the ones employed by Caselli and Coleman[6]
to study the determinants of cross-country technology diusion. Code 7521
refers to Analogue and hybrid data processing machines; code 7522 refers to
Complete digital data processing machines, comprising in the same housing
the central processing unit and one output unit; code 7523 refers to Complete
digital central processing units, digital processors consisting of arithmetical,
logical, and control elements; codes 7528 refers to O-line data processing
equipment, n.e.s. To measure net exports of the computers in the nal good
industry we restrict our analysis to the 7521 and 7522 codes.
Wages
Data on manufacturing wages come from Nicita and Olarreaga[26]. The wage
variable includes all payments in cash or in kind paid to employees during
the reference year in relation to work done for the establishment. Payments
include direct wages and salaries, remuneration for time not worked, bonuses
and gratuities, housing allowances and family allowances paid directly by
the employer, and payments in kind. Excluded are employer social-security
contributions on behalf of their employees, pension and insurance schemes, as
18well as the benets received by employees under these schemes, and severance
and termination pay. Our proxy is the average of industry wages over a ve-
year period.
Lending rates
Data on lending interest rates, a proxy for the cost of capital, come from
the International Financial Statistics data-set of the IMF. The measure is
dened as the annual average of the national lending rates.
TFP
Data on total factor productivity (TFP) has been obtained from Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare[21], who estimate TFP by substracting estimates of human
and physical capital per worker from GDP per worker.
The resulting sample covers 73 developing and developed countries over
the period 1980-2000. Table 1 presents the summary statistics.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
5.3 Descriptive analysis
Table 2 presents the list of countries that are located at the top and the
bottom of the distribution of countries ranked according to their net exports
of computers in 2000. For these countries the table reports their net exports
of computers, their capital/labor ratios, their skilled-labor/labor ratios, and
the positions the countries occupy in the rankings for each of these variables.
Each ranking ranges from 1-73.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
To assess if the data supports our theory, we compare the positions coun-
tries occupy in the net exports and relative factor endowments distributions.
According to the standard theory, if the production of computers is capi-
tal (skilled labor) intensive, we should expect to observe countries that are
relatively more abundant in this factor to be located at the top of the net
exports of computers distribution.
19Interestingly, the data in Table 2 seem remarkably far from the predic-
tions of the neo-classical theory. For example, among the set of capital
abundant countries, there are countries such as Korea Republic, Singapore,
and Japan, which are among the top net exporters of computers, and others
such as Switzerland, U.S.A, Italy, and France, which are at the bottom of
the net-exports distribution. Skilled-labor abundant countries such as Ko-
rea Republic and Japan are at the top of the net-exports distribution, while
other skilled-labor abundant countries such as U.S.A, Sweden, Canada, and
Australia are located at the bottom.
A similar pattern is also observed in the nal-goods computer industry.
Among capital intensive countries, we nd Singapore and Japan, which are
among the highest net exporters, and other countries such as Switzerland, the
U.S.A, Italy and France that are among the highest net-importers. Overall,
the data shows evidence that contradicts the standard theory. We devote
the following sections to explore this question in detail.
6 Results
The discussion of econometric results proceeds in stages. We rst discuss the
model as the standard factor-proportions theory. We also present the results
of the estimation of the model for various sub-samples of the data, which
are split at the median of potential technology-selection variables. These
selection variables are: (a) capital/labor ratio, (b) IPRs, (c) wage/lending
rate ratio, and (d) TFP. In turn, we report the results from the estimation
of the selection equation of the optimal 2-regime, 3-regime, and 4-regime
models, followed by a discussion of the estimated Rybczynski coecients of
the model that best ts the data. Formal tests of the null hypothesis that the
Rybczynski coecients are equivalent across regimes are also discussed. At
the end we discuss robustness tests, which entail the estimation of the two-
step approach with additional explanatory variables (namely relative factor
costs and national TFP dierences) in the selection equation.
206.1 Results for the standard theory
Table 3 presents the estimated Rybczynski coecients under the assumption
that all countries employ the same technology. The table shows that the
model is unsatisfactory, as none of the explanatory variables are statistically
signicant, both in the global and nal-goods computer industries.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Consistent with Hakura[15], the results improve when we estimate the
model for dierent sub-samples. Table 4 shows the estimations for various
samples, depending on the selection variables.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Two conclusions can be drawn from Table 4. First, the division of the
sample according to technology-selection variables improves substantially
econometric estimates. Second, there is important variation in the sign
and statistical signicance of the explanatory variables across sub-samples.
For example, capital abundance is a source of comparative advantage in the
production of computers and components for countries that are below the
median of the capital/labor ratio, IPRs, and TFP, while it is a source of
comparative disadvantage for countries above the median of the variables.
Unskilled-labor abundance is a source of comparative advantage for coun-
tries above the median of the capital/labor ratio and IPRs, while it is a
source of comparative disadvantage for countries below the median. That is,
there seems to be a notable technology-selection mechanism, which appears
to be related to endowments, IPRs, and national TFP dierences. The two-
step estimations discussed below improve upon these estimations by allowing
for a multi-variate selection mechanism.
6.2 Results for the two-step approach
This section presents the results from the implementation of the two-step
approach. We discuss the results from the estimation of the selection equa-
tion, followed by the results from the estimation of the Rybczynski equations
21for each technological group. We also test the null hypotheses that the Ry-
bczynski coecients are equivalent across these groups.
6.2.1 Selection equation
Table 5 shows the results of the estimation of the selection equations for the
optimal 2-regime, 3-regime, and 4-regime models. The dependent variable is
the technology index and the regressors include own capital over labor, own
IPRs, trading partners' capital/labor ratio, and trading partners' IPRs.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The own capital/labor ratio, the own IPRs, and the trading partners'
IPRs variables are statistically signicant at the 1% level in most of the
models, for both the global and nal-goods computer industries. The latent
index rises with these variables, a result that appears in all specications. It
is noteworthy that the signicance of a country's own endowments is con-
sistent with Schott's multiple-cones of specialization. In contrast, the sig-
nicance of IPRs and trading partner characteristics are new results for the
trade literature and lend credence to our theoretical model with endogenous
technology adoption. However, the eect of trading partners' capital/labor
ratio is ambiguous. Its estimated coecient is signicant and positive only
in the 3-regime model and for the global computer industry, but it is signif-
icant and negative in the other cases. The models that best t, those with
the lowest sum of squared residuals (SSR), have three or four technologi-
cal regimes, for the global computer industry and the nal-goods computer
industry, respectively.
Table 6 presents specication tests for the optimal models. The rst tests
the signicance of the cuto points or threshold values of the latent index,
which split the samples into technological regimes. These cuto points are
statistically dierent from each other in both industries, as re
ected in their
condence intervals that do not overlap.
Although it is not a test of the validity of the theory, the signicance of
the inverse of Mills Ratio in the second regime of the nal-goods computer
industry estimates suggests that the lack of control for technology choices
22delivers selection-bias in the estimated Rybczynski coecients. This evidence
of biased coecients is broadly consistent with Fitzgerald and Hallak[13],
who found that Rybczynski coecients tend to be biased when cross-country
productivity dierences are ignored.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
6.2.2 Rybczynski equations
Table 7 presents estimated Rybczynski coecients for each technological
regime. In the global computer industry, capital abundance is a source of
comparative advantage for countries that belong to the lowest and middle
regimes. However, it is a source of disadvantage for countries in the highest
regime. The coecients are statistically signicant at the 1% level. Evidence
in line with the rst result has also been provided by Harrigan[16], David and
Weinstein[8], Bernstein and Weinstein[4], and Leamer[24]. Evidence related
to the second result has been documented by Harrigan and Zakrajsek[18].
The authors do not nd systematically positive coecients on capital for
most manufacturing sectors.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Skilled labor abundance increases net exports of computers in the low-
est and highest regimes. This result is consistent with Harrigan and
Zakrajsek[18], who nd that educated workers have a strongly positive eect
on the production of electrical machinery sectors. By contrast, skilled labor
reduces net exports of computers in the middle regime. Unskilled labor has a
positive and statistically signicant impact on the net exports of computers
of the highest regime, but a signicant and negative eect on the production
of the lowest regime. The last nding contradicts Harrigan[16], who observes
that unskilled labor is a source of comparative advantage in most industries.
The impact of land also varies across regimes. It is signicant and positive
in the lowest regime, and signicant and negative in the other regimes.
In the nal-goods computer industry, the qualitative eects of skilled
labor and land resemble those of the global computer sector. However, capital
23is a source of comparative disadvantage for countries that belong to the lowest
regime, and unskilled labor is statistically insignicant across regimes.
Overall, the ndings are consistent with Schott[33], who documents het-
erogenous impact of factor endowments on within industry's output across
countries. One limitation of Schott's[33] analysis is that it does not jointly
control for variation in intra-industry product mix and technology dierences
across countries. The ongoing analysis lls this gap and provides evidence
consistent with Schott's ndings.
6.2.3 Are Rybczynski coecients equivalent across regimes?
Having presented preliminary evidence in line with our theory, we now dis-
cuss a formal test of the null hypothesis that the Rybczynski coecients are
equivalent across regimes. Table 8 reports the p-values corresponding to the
null hypothesis that the Rybczynski coecients of the regimes in brackets
are statistically equivalent. The Table shows that in spite of the fact that
we employ the least ecient method to estimate the model, which delivers
wider condence intervals for the estimated parameters, there is substantial
evidence supporting the theory. The null hypotheses are rejected at the 1%
level for many cases in both industries.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
6.3 Robustness checks
It may be argued, however, that the Rybczynski coecients vary across coun-
tries not because of technology adoption, but as a result of dierences in
relative factor prices. They may also dier because the quality of endow-
ments varies across countries, or because there are Hicks-neutral technology
dierences across economies, as in Fitzgerald and Hallak[13]. That is, these
variables could be correlated with our selection-equation regressors, our pre-
vious results could suer from omitted variables bias, and the estimated
heterogeneous Rybczynski coecients could be due to these other factors.
Two additional specications test the robustness of our results. The rst
24adds the wage/lending rate ratio to the set of explanatory variables in the
selection equation. The second adds national TFP levels to the previous set
of regressors. Table 9 reports these results.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Relative factor prices appear insignicant, and thereby play no role in
explaining the variation of the Rybczynski coecients across technological
regimes. In contrast, TFP is signicant and has a positive eect on the latent
selection variable. Yet the sign and statistical signicance of the regressors
of the baseline model remain intact. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the
coecients related to our theory, namely a country's own capital/labor ratio
and IPRs, are larger than in the baseline estimation. This suggests that
omitted variables bias had attenuated the estimated eect of our technology-
selection regressors.
With the expanded specication, the optimal models for both industries
have four technological regimes. The specication tests corresponding to the
complete model are reported in Table 10. In all but one of the regimes, the
inverse Mills ratio is statistically insignicant. Also, there is some overlap in
the estimates of the 95 percent condence intervals of the rst and second
cuto points in both industries. Again, it is worth clarifying that these tests
are not require to validate our proposed theory, the ndings of more than one
regime with heterogeneous Rybczynski coecients is sucient to support the
proposed model.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
The results from the estimation of the Rybczynski equations and the for-
mal tests of equivalence of these coecients across regimes appear in Tables
11 and 12. Once again the ndings support our theory, and the Rybczynski
coecients follow the same patterns as in Table 7.
[Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here]
257 Conclusion
The neoclassical model of trade predicts that international specialization
will be jointly determined by cross-country dierences in relative factor en-
dowments and exogenous technologies. Our proposed model relaxes the
Hicks-neutral technological dierences assumption by allowing countries to
adopt dierent technologies. The marriage of literatures on biased technical
change and trade yielded a tractable theory, whereby dierences in factor
endowments and intellectual property rights bias technical change towards
particular factors, and thus unit factor input requirements can vary across
economies.
We tested this theoretical model with data on net exports of a single in-
dustry, computers, intellectual property rights, factor endowments, and other
controls for 73 countries over the period 1980-2000. The descriptive and
econometric results provide robust evidence suggesting that once technologi-
cal choices are considered, countries exhibit dierent Rybczynski coecients.
This is partly due to dierences in factor endowments, as in Schott's multiple-
cone model of international specialization with identical technologies across
countries. But the evidence also indicates that dierences in intellectual
property rights and the characteristics of technology trading partners, which
also determine technology-adoption choices in our model but not in Shott's
theory, are associated with dierences in factor intensities across countries.
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298 Appendix
Proof rst stage of FGP's problem






















Multiplying both size of equation (24) by pc
jz(i), and then integrating over i,

















30Variable obs. mean std. dev min max
Net exports of computers  365 16952.93 2577342 -31100000 13200000
Net exports of computers (excluding components) 365 -5425236 4.24E+08 -4.16E+09 2.88E+09
Stock of capital 365 7.94E+11 2.16E+12 1.58E+09 2.13E+13
Skilled labor 365 7685.693 26463.59 14.19536 258038.5
Unskilled labor 365 13873.19 50602.99 65.86906 413936.7
Land 365 13000000 31900000 1000 1.89E+08
Wages 365 9.629792 9.496766 0.2007 59.1211
Lending rate 365 54.8177 253.0469 -117.4739 4774.53
TFP 365 10255.21 2983.809 2570 18795
IPRs 365 2.303616 1.24133 0 4.875
Note: This table reports summary statistics of the variables employed for the estimation of the two-step model.
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 Industry Country
Net exports of 
computers (X-M) Ranking Capital/Labor Ranking 
Skilled 
Labor/Labor Ranking
China 1.24E+07 1 1.45E+07 51 38.4 37
Malaysia 1.18E+07 2 5.76E+07 27 50.5 25
Singapore 1.05E+07 3 2.03E+08 3 59.1 17
Korea Rep. 9187286 4 2.42E+08 1 75.3 5
Philippines 6350562 5 1.61E+07 48 53.6 23
Ireland 5953102 6 1.04E+08 21 64.1 15
Japan 5000000 7 1.85E+08 5 71.9 8
Mexico 4675278 8 4.48E+07 29 40.3 36
Indonesia 2329506 9 1.61E+07 49 26.8 50
India 33958 10 7649168 58 22.2 56
Denmark -1196473 64 1.44E+08 12 68.1 12
U.K. -1200000 65 1.11E+08 20 58.2 18
Sweden -1592865 66 1.32E+08 16 80.3 3
Spain -1613921 67 1.13E+08 18 46.9 30
Switzerland -2773254 68 2.03E+08 2 71 9
Australia -3062108 69 1.48E+08 10 73.4 6
France -3942278 70 1.52E+08 9 55.7 20
Italy -4117605 71 1.53E+08 8 46.7 31
Canada -5744931 72 1.40E+08 14 79.6 4
U.S.A -3.11E+07 73 1.60E+08 7 89.7 1
Table 2: Net-exports of computers and factor endowments
Note: This table presents the countries at the top and bottom of the distribution of net-exports of computers. For each of these countries the 
table reports their net-exports, capital/labor ratio and skilled-labor/labor ratio.
Global computer industry 
(final-goods and components)
 Industry Country
Net exports of 
computers (X-M) Ranking Capital/Labor Ranking 
Skilled 
Labor/Labor Ranking
Mexico 2.60E+09 1 4.48E+07 29 40.3 36
Ireland 1.62E+09 2 1.04E+08 21 64.1 15
Malaysia 1.05E+09 3 5.76E+07 27 50.5 26
Japan 4.20E+08 4 1.85E+08 4 71.9 8
China 2.27E+08 5 1.45E+07 51 38.4 37
Singapore 68000000 6 2.03E+08 2 59.1 17
Indonesia 48000000 7 1.61E+07 48 26.8 50
Netherlands 30000000 8 1.43E+08 13 67.4 14
Philippines 18700000 9 1.61E+07 49 53.6 23
Turkey -2.55E+08 63 3.11E+07 36 22.3 55
Denmark -2.61E+08 64 1.44E+08 12 68.1 12
Spain -3.52E+08 65 1.13E+08 18 46.9 30
Sweden -4.07E+08 66 1.32E+08 16 80.3 3
Switzerland -4.36E+08 67 2.03E+08 3 71 9
Australia -5.83E+08 68 1.48E+08 10 73.4 6
Italy -8.55E+08 69 1.53E+08 8 46.7 31
UK -9.60E+08 70 1.11E+08 20 58.2 18
France -1.22E+09 71 1.52E+08 9 55.7 20
Canada -1.23E+09 72 1.40E+08 14 79.6 4
USA -4.16E+09 73 1.60E+08 7 89.7 1
Note: This table presents the countries at the top and bottom of the distribution of net-exports of computers. For each of these countries the 
table reports their net-exports, capital/labor ratio and skilled-labor/labor ratio.
Table 2: Net-exports of computers and factor endowments (Cont'd)
Final-goods computer 
industry





















Note: This table shows the results of neoclassical Rybczynski equations, for the global computer industry
(final goods and components) and for the final good computer industry. The dependent variables are net-
exports of computers for each industry. The independent variables are capital, skilled labor, unskilled labor
and land. The results control for time effects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *** means
statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 5%, and * 10%.
Global computer industry (final-
goods and components)
Final-goods computer industry
Table 3. Neo-classical Rybczynski equations
 Below median Above media Below median Above media Below median Above media Below median Above media
Capital abundance 1.96E-06 -2.34E-06 1.51E-06 -2.18E-06 -4.63E-07 -1.14E-06 7.72E-07 -3.70E-06
[3.53E-07]*** [1.74E-06] [5.51E-07]*** [1.61E-06]*** [5.48E-07] [1.47E-06] [7.95E-08]*** [1.21E-06]***
Skilled-labor abundance -2.01E+01 4.64E+02 -8.77E+00 4.38E+02 6.40E+01 2.65E+02 1.42E+01 4.78E+02
[1.99E+01] [2.67E+02]* [2.23E+01] [2.42E+02]* [1.78E+01] [2.06E+02] [6.11E+00]** [1.67E+02]***
Unskilled-labor 
abundance -4.65E+00 1.40E+02 -1.14E+00 1.17E+02 -2.18E+01 -3.96E+01 -4.70E+00 1.74E+02
[8.64E+00] [6.77E+01]** [7.79E+00] [6.63E+01]* [1.02E+01]** [4.84E+01] [4.95E+00] [1.21E+02]
Land abundance  -6.42E-03 -1.17E-01 -1.56E-02 -1.12E-01 1.45E-02 -8.99E-02 -9.23E-03 -2.42E-02
[8.90E-03] [4.30E-02]*** [1.29E-02] [4.42E-03]** [1.02E-02] [3.65E-02]** [8.03E-03] [3.31E-02]
Constant -2.91E+03 2.97E+05 -4.81E+04 [3.51E+04] -2.11E+04 4.92E+05 -1.50E+05 7.69E+04
[3.35E+04] [3.46E+05] 1.74E+05 [2.72E+05] [8.07E+04] [4.39E+05] [1.22E+05] [1.22E+05]
Capital abundance -3.30E-05 5.62E-05 2.97E-05 -3.78E-04 -1.33E-04 -1.68E-04 1.29E-04 -5.59E-04
[1.26E-06]*** [1.83E-05]*** [2.12E-05] [2.26E-04]* [5.18E-05]*** [2.07E-04] [7.07E-06]*** [1.50E-04]***
Skilled-labor abundance -1.30E+03 -1.98E+03 -7.10E+02 7.93E+04 5.58E+03 4.19E+04 1.20E+03 7.75E+04
[1.11E+02] [8.80E+02]** [9.73E+02] [3.50E+04]** [1.01E+03]* [6.91E+03] [1.62E+03]*** [2.45E+04]***
Unskilled-labor 
abundance -6.05E+01 5.02E+02 1.27E+02 1.82E+04 -1.84E+03 -7.54E+03 -4.39E+03 1.54E+04
[9.87E+00]*** [4.70E+02] [3.97E+02] [1.16E+04] [1.83E+03]*** [3.01E+04] [1.39E+03] [1.71E+04]
Land abundance  1.41E-01 -6.20E-01 -4.89E-01 -1.55E+01 2.16E+00 -9.55E+00 -1.83E+00 -1.09E+00
[4.27-03]*** [5.37E-01] [5.47E-01] [6.40E+00]** [1.39E+00]* [5.45E+00]* [1.80E+00] [4.73E+00]
Constant -1.48E+06 4.12E+07 -3.99E+05 1.64E+07 -8.09E+05 6.73E+07 -2.04E+07 2.24E+07
[1.46E+06] [4.76E+07] [1.52E+06] [4.50E+07] [1.93E+07] [4.48E+07] [1.59E+07] [4.32E+07]





Note: This table shows the results of the Rybczynski equations for countries that are located below and above the median of capital/labor (K/L), intellectual property rights (IPRs), wage/lending 
rate, and total factor productivity (TFP). The dependent variables are net exports of computers in the global computer and the final-good computer industries. The independent variables are 
capital, skilled-labor, unskilled-labor and land. The results control for time effects. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *** means statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 5%, 
and * 10%.
K/L ratio IPRs






 Industry 2-regimes 3-regimes 4-regimes
Capital/Labor 6.85E-08 8.27E-08 1.03E-07
[1.56E-08]*** [1.01E-08 ]*** [1.20E-08]***
IPRs 2.38E+00 2.22E+00 2.36E+00
[0.6187 ]*** [0.2561]*** [0.28524]***
Capital/Labor -2.10E-08 5.14E+01 -1.04E-08
[ 1.00e-08]*** [8.5543]*** [4.65e-09]**
IPRs 4.02E+01 5.14E+01 3.55E+01
[1.23E+01]*** [8.5543]*** [6.4661]***
SSR 1.61E+15 1.69E+09 5.64E+14
Capital/Labor 1.38E-07 8.16E-08 7.36E-08
[5.74E-08]** [1.06E-08 ]*** [7.16E-09]***
IPRs 2.57E+00 2.07E+00 1.79E+00
[1.1474]** [0.30647]*** [ 0.19044]***
Capital/Labor -4.35E-08 8.35E-10 -9.14E-09
[2.23E-08]** [5.19e-09 ] [3.58e-09]***
IPRs 7.73E+01 3.49E+01 2.95E+01
[32.586]** [5.9819]*** [4.0935]***
SSR 4.59E+19 4.32E+19 4.33E+19
Table 5. Two-step approach. Estimation of the Selection Equation
Global computer industry          
(final-goods and components)
Final-goods computer industry
Note: This table present the results of the selection equation for the 2-regime, 3-regime, and 4-regime models. The dependent variable is categorical and  
captures countries' technology choices. The independent variables are capital/labor ratio and intellectual property rights protection (IPRs) of each 
country as well as that of its technology trading partners (inversely weighted by bilateral distance). SSR means sum of squared residuals. Standard errors 














[3.8125 ,  5.9019]***
Cutoff_3 12.3037
[10.0106 , 14.5968]***
Note: This table shows the estimated values of the technologycal index at which the sample splits across regimes (cutoff), together with their confidence 
intervals. The table also presents the estimated coefficients for the variable that controls for selection bias (Inverse Mills Ratio). Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. *** means statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5%, and * 10%.
62800000 -89100000
[3204522] [6210496]** [7.38e+07] [1.87E+08]
n.a
n.a
Final-goods computer industry Inverse Mills Ratio
Test




Table 6. Specification tests for the baseline model that best fits the data
-75592.68 126004.3 -880412.4
[207762] [91009.17] [743991]
 Industry  Net-exports of computers regime 1 regime 2 regime 3 regime 4
Capital abundance 1.90E-06 1.66E-06 -1.95E-06 n.a.
[7.33E-07]*** [1.41E-07 ]*** [ 4.06E-07]*** n.a.
Skilled-labor abundance 5.53E+01 -2.42E+01 4.05E+02 n.a.
[22.4488]** [12.6323]** [ 78.4266]*** n.a.
Unskilled-labor abundance -3.40E+01 1.44E+01 1.05E+02 n.a.
[8.62937]*** [9.6125] [40.0186]*** n.a.
Land abundance  1.42E-02 -4.20E-02 -1.08E-01 n.a.
[0.00678]** [0.0110]*** [0.01953]*** n.a.
Constant 4.81E+04 -9.33E+03 1.03E+06 n.a.
[133791] [133373] [ 750228.6] n.a.
Capital abundance -7.60E-05 5.33E-05 3.61E-04 -3.71E-04
[0.00001]*** [8.47E-06]*** [0.00019]* [0.00010]***
Skilled-labor abundance 1.04E+03 -1.74E+03 7.67E+04 8.56E+04
[360.2037]*** [772.3358 ]** [19946.58]*** [19225.73]**
Unskilled-labor abundance -4.68E+01 7.25E+02 -9.11E+03 5.19E+03
[138.156] [588.9245] [9268.00] [ 17159.76 ]
Land abundance  3.53E-01 -1.67E+00 -1.73E+01 -1.61E+01
[0.1087]** [0.6735]** [5.5219]*** [5.1654]***
Constant -1.06E+06 -7.86E+06 -1.98E+08 9.75E+08
[2157942] [8503779]*** [1.01E+08]** [3.68e+08]**




Table 7. Estimation of the Rybczynski equations for the optimal models
Note: This table shows the results of the Rybczynski equations for the 3-regime model, for the global computer (final goods and
components) andfinal-goodcomputer industries. The dependent variables are net-exports of computers for each industry. The independent
variables are capital, skilled labor, unskilled labor and land. The results control for the "consumption effect" and time effects. Standard
















Global computer industry          
(final-goods and components)
Note: This table presents the p-values corresponding to the null hypothesis of equivalence between 
the Rybczynski coefficients of two different regimes in the 3-regime model. The brackets indicate the 
regimes involves in each test. *** means significant at the 1% level, ** 5% , and * 10%.
































Table 8. Are the Rybczynski coefficients equivalent across regimes? (Cont'd)
Note: This table presents the p-values corresponding to the null hypothesis of equivalence
between the Rybczynski coefficients of two different regimes in the 4-regime model. The brackets
indicate the regimes involved in each test. *** means statistically significant at the 1% level, **
5%, and * 10%.  Capital/Labor 8.27E-08 8.37E-08 8.75E-08
[1.01E-08 ]*** [1.09E-08]*** [1.09E-08]***
IPRs 2.22E+00 2.08E+00 2.69E+01
[0.2561]*** [0.2970]*** [5.4074]***




Capital/Labor 5.14E+01 -3.96E-09 -5.05E-09
[8.5543]*** [5.21E-09] [ 4.32E-09]
IPRs 5.14E+01 3.01E+01 2.69E+01
[8.5543]*** [5.5495]*** [5.4074]***
SSR 1.69E+09 1.51E+15 1.44E+15
Country's Capital/Labor 8.16E-08 7.51E-08 8.75E-08
[1.06E-08 ]*** [7.42E-09]*** [1.09E-08]***
IPRs 2.07E+00 1.80E+00 2.52E+00
[0.30647]*** [0.19083]*** [0.31321]***




Trading partners' Capital/Labor 8.35E-10 -9.09E-09 -5.05E-09
[5.19e-09 ] [3.59e-09]*** [4.32e-09]
IPRs 3.49E+01 28.6955 2.69E+01
[5.9819]*** [4.1487]*** [5.4074]***
SSR 4.32E+19 4.33E+19 4.46E+19
Table 9. Robustness check: Selection Equation
Final-goods computer industry








+ factor prices 
+ TFP
Note: This table presents the estimated coefficientsof the selection equation corresponding to the optimal model. The first column reports
coefficients of the baseline model. The second column results add to the set of explanatory variables the wage/lending rate. The third column
results add to the set of explanatory variables total factor productivity (TFP). All the regressions control for time effects. Standarderrors
are reported in brackets. *** means statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 5%, and * 10%. SSR means sum of squared residuals. 
Industry Dependent variable: Technology index



















Table 10. Robustness check: Specification tests
Note: This table shows estimated values of the technologycal index at which the sample splits across regimes (cutoff), together with their confidence intervals. The table 
also presents coefficients for the variables that control for selection bias (Inverse Mills Ratio). Time effects are not reported. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
*** means statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 5%, and * 10%.
-1815631 10614.36 3.81E+07 -5.83E+07
40135.71









 Net-exports of computers regime 1 regime 2 regime 3 regime 4
Capital abundance 7.25E-07 -1.69E-07 2.69E-06 -2.56E-06
[ 3.44E-07]** [1.30E-07] [5.49E-07 ]*** [ 5.92E-07]***
Skilled-labor abundance 2.02E+00 2.92E+01 1.09E+02 5.03E+02
[10.0727] [7.4703]*** [88.1423] [110.074]***
Unskilled-labor abundance -6.58E+00 2.20E+01 -7.05E+01 1.76E+02
[4.6158] [6.0202]*** [44.8552] [100.7755]*
Land abundance  8.20E-04 -1.92E-02 -7.99E-02 -1.08E-01
[0.00555] [0.00471]*** [0.03040]*** [0.0288]***
Constant 3.94E+04 -3.85E+04 2.74E+05 4.21E+06
[153743] [39860] [447515] [2098217 ]**
Capital abundance -4.10E-05 3.11E-07 3.00E-05 -3.63E-04
[6.49E-06 ]*** [0.000014] [0.00011] [0.00010]***
Skilled-labor abundance 8.47E+01 24.8714 6.31E+04 8.21E+04
[190.2525] [834.7603] [18828] [18989]***
Unskilled-labor abundance 1.22E+02 1040.17 -1.81E+02 6.69E+03
[87.2031] [ 671.712 ] [9581] [17386]
Land abundance  1.16E-01 -1.54E+00 -8.81E+00 -1.48E+01
[0.10494] [0.52461]*** [6.4961] [4.9733]
Constant -2.55E+06 -2.00E+05 -1.46E+08 9.46E+08
[2900038] [ 43962] [9.56E+07] [3.62E+08]***




Table 11. Robustness check: Rybczynski equations
Baseline selection equation + factor prices + TFP
Note: This table shows Rybczynski equations for the 4-regime model, for the global computer (final goods and components) and final-goods computer industries. The 
dependent variables are net-exports of each industry. The independent variables are capital, skilled labor, unskilled labor and land. The results control for the
"consumption effect" (see text) and time effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** means statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 5 %, and * 10%.
 Capital abundance_[reg1=reg2] 0.0149** Capital abundance_[reg1=reg2] 0.0082***
Capital abundance_[reg1=reg3] 0.0024*** Capital abundance_[reg1=reg3] 0.5325
Capital abundance_[reg1=reg4] 0.000*** Capital abundance_[reg1=reg4] 0.0017***
Capital abundance_[reg2=reg3] 0.000*** Capital abundance_[reg2=reg3] 0.7893
Capital abundance_[reg2=reg4] 0.0001*** Capital abundance_[reg2=reg4] 0.0004***
Capital abundance_[reg3=reg4] 0.000*** Capital abundance_[reg3=reg4] 0.0111***
Skilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg2] 0.0305** Skilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg2] 0.9443
Skilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg3] 0.2285 Skilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg3] 0.0008***
Skilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg4] 0.000*** Skilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg4] 0.000***
Skilled-labor abundance_[reg2=reg3] 0.3676 Skilled-labor abundance_[reg2=reg3] 0.0008***
Skilled-labor abundance_[reg2=reg4] 0.000*** Skilled-labor abundance_[reg2=reg4] 0.000***
Skilled-labor abundance_[reg3=reg4] 0.0052*** Skilled-labor abundance_[reg3=reg4] 0.4755
Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg2] 0.0002*** Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg2] 0.1752
Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg3] 0.1561 Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg3] 0.9748
Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg4] 0.070* Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg1=reg4] 0.7058
Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg2=reg3] 0.041** Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg2=reg3] 0.8989
Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg2=reg4] 0.1265 Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg2=reg4] 0.7456
Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg3=reg4] 0.0253** Unskilled-labor abundance_[reg3=reg4] 0.7294
Land abundance_[reg1=reg2] 0.0061*** Land abundance_[reg1=reg2] 0.002***
Land abundance_[reg1=reg3] 0.009*** Land abundance_[reg1=reg3] 0.1695
Land abundance_[reg1=reg4] 0.0002*** Land abundance_[reg1=reg4] 0.0027***
Land abundance_[reg2=reg3] 0.0485** Land abundance_[reg2=reg3] 0.2644
Land abundance_[reg2=reg4] 0.0023** Land abundance_[reg2=reg4] 0.0079***
Land abundance_[reg3=reg4] 0.4989 Land abundance_[reg3=reg4] 0.4632
Constant_[reg1=reg2] 0.624 Constant_[reg1=reg2] 0.6556
Constant_[reg1=reg3] 0.6201 Constant_[reg1=reg3] 0.1348
Constant_[reg1=reg4] 0.0474** Constant_[reg1=reg4] 0.0088***
Constant_[reg2=reg3] 0.4868 Constant_[reg2=reg3] 0.1287
Constant_[reg2=reg4] 0.0429** Constant_[reg2=reg4] 0.009***







Table 12. Are the Rybczynski coefficients equivalent across regimes?  Table 12. Are the Rybczynski coefficients equivalent across regimes? (Cont'd)
Note: This table presents the p-values corresponding to the null hypothesis of
equivalence between the Rybczynski coefficients of two different regimes in the 4-
regime model. The brackets indicate the regimes involved in each test. *** means
statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5%, and * 10%.
Note: This table presents the p-values corresponding to the null hypothesis of
equivalence between the Rybczynski coefficients of two different regimes in the 4-
regime model. The brackets indicate the regimes involved in each test. *** means
statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5%, and * 10%.  